ENTRY INTO EXPORT MARKETS AS AN INCENTIVE TO
Introduction
Russia's WTO accession, when the process is completed, will drastically change the trade and competitive environments for Russian producers, in both the domestic and international markets. The benefits of trade liberalization are apparent for the resource and other primary sectors, but it is unclear how these changes may impact Russia's manufacturing industries.
Reasonable concerns have been raised about the low competitiveness of many firms in this sector with respect to costs and product quality, and on their capacity to embrace modern management and process technologies, punctuated by their inadequate skills in building effective client and supplier relationships. It is not yet clear how these firms would respond to soaring competitive pressures, and whether they have access to the instruments and resources that would allow them to address new challenges through management enhancements and the effective adoption of new technologies, managerial practices, expertise and knowledge. In other words, will these firms be able to take advantage of trade liberalization and learn lessons from Learning-by-exporting effects are extensively discussed in the economic literature.
However, the most quoted papers seem to have a somewhat different focus from ours: is there any evidence at all to support the existence of learning-by-exporting effects per se? Many authors argue that we may be wrong to make conclusions about the nature of such effects when we discuss general regularities observable across the world; specifically, that exporters tend to be more productive, more inclined to innovate, better organized and managed than firms with only domestic, or, all the more so, local orientations. It is argued that in most cases exporters possessed all of these qualities before they entered global markets, and that their high performance and propensity to innovate induced them to enter export markets rather than the other way around [see Greenaway, D. and Kneller, R., 2004 for a review of the literature]. In another paper, we joined this discussion and found self-selection effects, i.e., when the most productive firms self select into export markets, in Russia's manufacturing sector [Golikova, Gonchar, Kuznetsov, forthcoming] . However, in this paper we proceed from an understanding that once a Russian manufacturing firm has entered an export market, it is essential for it to learn through a process of global engagement if it wants to retain this newly gained market niche.
Faced with tense competition, choosy customers, and a more advanced business culture, the firm has to improve more quickly and to a greater extent than other market participants that are still guided by the perception that weak domestic competition and access to administrative resources can make up for their languid performance in the market. Moreover, due to the nature of innovations in the Russian manufacturing sector, the highest returns come from organizational and managerial rather than product or technology innovations. Arguably, it is easier to "learn" the latter from one's foreign partners than to embrace a capacity to generate full cycle innovations at the technology frontier. We attempt an empirical assessment of learning-byexporting effects, as we interpret learning as post-entry changes, including organizational innovations, in firm innovative behavior following its entry into global markets.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we survey the overall setting of the Russian manufacturing sector from the perspective of its exporting potential and possible learning-byexporting effects. Then we review the global theoretical and empirical literature predicting and testing key regularities related to our subject. We describe the dataset used in the study, elaborate the model, formulate our hypotheses and present the descriptive statistics for the variables we use to test our hypotheses. In the conclusion, we report and interpret the estimation results.
Exporting in Russian manufacturing
Macrodata suggest that the export base in manufacturing is shrinking relative to other sectors, while trade competitiveness, measured by RCA (revealed comparative advantage), is also deteriorating. Meanwhile, the share of Russian companies in global manufacturing markets is already so small that there hardly seems any room for further contraction.
The modest shares of Russian non-resource exports are most often described as a catch-22 situation: on the one hand, Russian manufacturing goods cannot compete on costs with goods from low-cost economies, while, on the other hand, they are undercut on quality in the high-cost segment. Additionally, Russian companies are not yet widely engaged in global value chains controlled by multinationals; therefore, this mechanism to expand manufacturing exports that is widely utilized by our East European counterparts is not yet fully operational. As a result, the export product structure is dominated by obsolete products and targets shrinking traditional markets. A decomposition of the sources of the growth in Russian exports from [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] shows that during this period, firms mostly tended to expand their traditional exports to traditional markets, or at most penetrated new markets with their old products; offering new products, either to traditional and/or new markets, was insignificant [Correa, 2011] . Therefore, we can suppose with some caution that about 10 percent of manufacturing firms export. By international measures, this is substandard for a large economy with developed manufacturing: for example, in Japan's manufacturing sector, exporters account for 31 percent of the total population (adjusted for firms with n/a data), according to 2003 data [Ito, Lechevalier, 2010] . However, given the high concentration of exports in selected segments of tradable goods and the group of large and medium-sized enterprises, there are grounds to suggest there is a sizable group of exporters in Russian manufacturing. Moreover, exporters appear to be key influences on the modern shape of Russian industry because, according to the RUSLANA database, the top 10 percent of firms produce over 60 percent of total manufacturing output.
Microdata confirm with some degree of certainty that Russian manufacturing firms are gradually opening up to the world -not only through their exporting, but via other globalization Rosstat survey data on innovative products in manufacturing exports show that this share is larger than is generally believed. However, it varies widely across sectors, from virtually no new products in textile and garment exports, to almost all products being innovative in food exports (Fig. 2) . Admittedly, the latter may not be so much a sign of the innovative nature of this industry, as the result of excessively lax criteria for branding products as innovative. 
Economic literature on the links between exports and innovations
As mentioned above, self-selection effects -i.e., when more productive firms self-select into export markets -have been hypothesized, simulated and supported by extensive empirical evidence. The learning-by-exporting effects are more controversial, with less conclusive evidence and more diverging views. It may be of note that innovations in the context of exporting are usually discussed as mechanisms or links that generate productivity enhancements as a result of exposure to export markets [Aw et al., 2009; Castellani and Zanfei, 2007] .
Moreover, convincing evidence is available that interactions between investments in exporting strategies and innovations make such firms more competitive on a sustainable basis [Ito, Lechevalier, 2010] . Therefore, innovations may be interpreted as a condition for productivity gains that result from the firm's entry into export markets.
The underlying theoretical model used to explore learning-by-exporting effects is the Melitz and Bernard model for heterogeneous firms engaged in international trade [Melitz, 2003 , Bernard et al., 1999 , which predicts that because more productive firms generate higher profit gains they are able to afford high entry costs. This would lead to inter-firm reallocations toward more productive firms, resulting in aggregate industry productivity growth. In a more recent paper, [Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004] provide a ranking of firms based on their engagement in globalization; these authors predict that the most productive firms choose to engage in FDI, the less productive are active in the domestic market as well as in foreign markets, still less productive firms choose to serve only the domestic market, while the least productive have to exit altogether.
We are interested in the extensions of Melitz's model that postulate technological choice and predict productivity growth in the economy, not only as a result of driving non-productive firms out, but also because trade liberalization encourages the use of more progressive technologies and brings higher returns from R&D investments. In their new model, [Constantini and Melitz, 2008] show how market size may affect a firm's choice in favor of exports or innovations, and prove that a firm's productivity growth is endogenous and influenced by its decision to innovate. Meanwhile, the firm's performance in foreign markets is determined by its new competences and technological advancement, yet irrelevant for the domestic market.
[ Hallak and Sivadasan, 2009 ] use their theoretical model to show that exporters are more likely to sell higher quality products at higher prices than non-exporters.
Therefore, the theoretical work has proven that export status and innovations are at least complementary (if not that there are direct learning-by-exporting effects), when one investment decision (to export) becomes a condition for another investment decision (to innovate), and vice versa. Complementarities are largely achieved because both exports and innovations provide potential opportunities for new knowledge [Aw et al., 2005; Castellani and Zanfei, 2007] , and because of possible links between product and process innovations [Damijan et al., 2008] . Quite often, a firm's decision to introduce a new product would precede its decision to engage in exporting, while subsequent export proceeds allow the firm to start more expensive process innovations, leading to an increase in productivity. [Sutton, 2007] predicted learning-by exporting-effects for exporters in transition economies via vertical knowledge transmission in multinational value chains.
Complementarities between exporting and innovations make it possible to establish a performance ranking, with the exporting and innovative firms being the best-performing, followed by the innovative firms, exporting firms, and then firms that do not participate in either activity [Ito, Lechevalier, 2010] . Admittedly, some works argue against complementarities in a situation of heavy resource constraints, when the firm has to choose between exporting and innovations, and these decisions would be more competitive (replacement effect) than complementary. Specifically, [Wakelin, 1998] , found that innovative firms are less likely to export than non-innovative firms, while large, innovative firms are more likely to be exporters than small innovative firms. The author accounts for the above replacement effect by arguing that resource constraints do not allow for simultaneous investments in innovations and in exporting.
Empirical tests of the interaction between exporting and innovations produce mixed results. [Wagner, 2007] , the author of the most exhausting review of works in this area,
indicates that the empirical literature provides a great deal of evidence supporting the selfselection hypothesis, while research substantiating the learning-by-exporting hypothesis is virtually absent. However, empirical studies utilizing data from emerging and transition economies seem to stand out, as they show that global engagement tends to intensify the innovative activities of firms. Thus, [Bustos, 2011] , in her study of the implications of BrazilArgentina bilateral trade liberalization, provides convincing evidence that exporting increases the firm's revenues and its propensity to invest in technology upgrading. Therefore, on the national scale, benefits from trade liberalization tend to exceed entry costs because more firms would attempt to invest in advanced technologies.
[ Gorodnichenko et al., 2010] , using data from 27 emerging market economies, provide evidence that exports, imports and involvement in the supply chains of multinational corporations result in intensified innovative activities. Moreover, the stronger a firm's market position, the stronger the learning-by-globalization effects would be.
However, globalization provides a chance, but in no way a guarantee, of overcoming a technology gap. The question of who has better chances -firms lagging the furthest behind or those closer to the leaders -receives a variety of answers in the literature. Some authors believe that the bigger the gap the better the firm's chances for learning-by-exporting and for catching up with the leader [Gershenkron, 1962 , Fagerberg, 1994 , Julan Dua et al, 2010 . Other authors, building on the empirical evidence from East European transformations, argue that the learningby-exporting effects are likely to be stronger for firms closer to the technology frontier [Aghion, Bessonova, 2006] .
Our primary focus in this study is to discover how international trade impacts innovations. The literature most often refers to such export-related incentives for innovation as competition and knowledge transfer from importers to exporters. Specifically, in their overview, [Greenaway and Kneller, 2007] identify three types of mechanisms to encourage innovative behavior in the context of international trade: interaction with foreign competitors, greater economies of scale and enhanced competition. Human capital enhancements are also often mentioned, due to increased requirements for product quality in international markets. Below we discuss papers exploring these transmission channels between exporting and technology and business innovations.
The most simple mechanism is based on the complementarities between exports and innovations. I.e. the accumulation of export revenues provides funds for innovations, while the latter, in their turn, provide a basis for export changes and help to drop the no-win strategy of price competition. For example, [Kandogan, 2004] explores the drivers behind the growing role played by transition economies in global trade between 1992 and 1998. The author demonstrates that most of the countries in the panel began exporting with low-price products of relatively substandard quality. However, as export revenues accumulated and enterprises restructured, products improved as a result of upgraded production technologies. It is of note that the Central European countries improved 40 percent of their exports between 1992 and 1998, while the performances of the Baltic States, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine were somewhat less impressive. [Fabrizio, Igan, and Mody, 2007] , found similar results and showed that the key drivers behind the increased shares of global trade held by transition economies were improved quality of exports and switching from price competition to quality competition.
Another relatively unsophisticated mechanism for exporting to impact innovations is via direct borrowing of new knowledge, technologies and business models. As exporters interact with their foreign clients, they obtain know-how, embrace better management practices and gradually increase their productivity. Foreign buyers frequently transfer the so-called informal knowledge to their suppliers, ensuring goods of acceptable quality. [Grossman and Helpman, 1991] , in particular, showed that more advanced importers often transfer finished production models to exporters ready for replication, and provide advisory and engineering services.
[ Greenaway and Kneller, 2004] argue that export entry changes the innovative behavior of firms.
Even if exporters were initially more innovative than domestic firms, their international engagement modifies the nature of their innovative activities, making them opt for the most cutting-edge technologies, including foreign design and developments.
Still another mechanism of boosting innovations via increased market power of exporters is derived from the Shumpeterian model, which predicts that larger firms with resources available for innovative activities are more likely to innovate. Exporting helps the firm to increase its market share and returns to scale, which, in turn, would reduce R&D unit costs and other innovation expenses.
The issue of the degree to which innovations are induced by increased competitive pressures on an export starter may be more ambiguous. This issue is addressed in the literature exploring the effects of competition on firms' innovative behavior. These papers argue that competition generally serves as an incentive to innovate [Arrow, 1962] . However, large companies in concentrated markets may use their monopoly rents to generate innovations (the Shumpeterian School), while firm responses to increased competition pressures would at a minimum be heterogeneous, depending on their initial distance to the technological frontier (Shumpeter's theory as developed in works by [Aghion et al., 2004 [Aghion et al., , 2005 ). Therefore, we may argue (with some caution) that increased exposure to competition as a result of export market entry may spur innovation, especially for firms with enough market power that are initially closer to the technology frontier.
Finally, we should discuss the limitations of learning by exporting effects. The authors note varying, sector-specific firm responses. For example, [Julan Dua et al., 2010] , using a dataset from China's manufacturing industries, prove that exporting has virtually no effect on firm behavior in mature, low-technology sectors (food, textiles, and garments), while learningby-exporting effects are more pronounced in medium-and high-technology industries (electronics, telecommunication equipment and pharmaceuticals). Moreover, the adoption of cutting-edge technologies takes time and special effort; therefore, learning effects may not be seen immediately, but rather with a lag.
Many studies find that the probability of innovative learning-by-exporting depends on export destinations. Thus, exports directed to high-income countries require a higher quality workforce and encourage the exporter to develop business models involving fringe distribution, transportation and publicity services. The latter, in turn, also need higher quality human resources, further inducing firms to innovate [Verhoogen, 2008 , Matsuyama, 2007 . Using data from Argentina, [Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto, 2010] , show that it is not exporting per se, but export destinations that impact the quality of human capital and average wages at the firm level.
In the Russian case, learning-by-exporting effects, including the impact of export destinations (CIS and OECD), were explored by [Wilhelmsson, Kozlov, 2007] . However, it should be noted that the authors focus more on the learning outcomes, i.e., the increased productivity of exporters. The study finds that in this sense of "learning", exporting to developed countries has a more pronounced effect for export starters. However, subsequently, the differences between CIS exporters, non-exporters and OECD exporters tend to fade out, which does not allow for decisive conclusions about the impact of export destination on productivity growth.
In sum, a review of the literature suggests that it is reasonable to postulate that exporting boosts firm innovative activities for Russian manufacturing firms. We recognize, of course, that exporting is not the only incentive to innovate, and may not be the primary one. However, exports and innovations combined are very likely to affect a firm's competitiveness. Therefore, an investigation of the linkages between exporting and innovation may at least aid in the construction of a meaningful model for increased competitiveness in the Russian manufacturing industry. Moreover, such a model linking investments in exporting and innovation will be costly and, therefore, only affordable for more powerful firms.
Key Hypotheses
This paper attempts to look into several issues related to the correlation between a firm's export status and its innovative behavior. Our primary interest is to find out whether exporting impacts a firm's propensity to adopt technological and managerial innovations. In our analysis, Another issue we would like to research is whether the length of a firm's presence in export markets impacts the intensity of its learning and innovative behavior. Is the learning effect of a one-off nature or is it prolonged over time? Put differently, does an export starter quickly learn the basics of competition and make appropriate innovative adjustments to its behavior, or does it take time for exporting to have an effect? For the purpose of this study and with regard to the available data, our second prediction reads as follows:
Hypothesis 2. A long presence in export markets tends to enhance learning effects. In other words, incumbent exporters learn more quickly than export starters.
Finally, we plan to test the degree to which export destinations (in our case, CIS and non-CIS) impact learning effects. We shall try to find evidence in support of our prediction that exporting to more developed (presumably more competitive) markets will have stronger learning effects than exporting to former USSR countries. 
Data and empirical statistics

Source: data from two rounds of a manufacturing business survey conducted by the Higher School of Economics Institute for Industrial and Market Studies (IIMS)
The survey questionnaire allows export products to be described in terms of their presence (export status), scale (share of total firm sales), composition (raw materials, semifinished goods, finished goods, services) and destination (CIS and non-CIS Other areas show less significant differences, which makes the evidence on learning-byexporting effects in ex-USSR markets less conclusive.
Estimation approach and model description
Both theoretical and empirical research suggests that there are other determinants impacting "learning" and innovative development of firms, apart from exporting. In particular, the propensity to innovate and implement new managerial technologies may depend on the sector and the firm's size. Apart from these factors, we postulate that ownership (specifically, foreign ownership and government ownership) may also have a role. Finally, a firm's membership in an integrated group (vertically or horizontally integrated) may also be important.
As a general approach to empirically estimate learning effects, we use the following model:
where LEf i stands for various measures describing firm activities in innovations and managerial and organizational improvements, Exp_status -denotes its export status, Size represents firm size, Ownership refers to firm ownership characteristics (including its membership in integrated groups), Age represents the age of the firm, and Ind indicates its type of activity.
Theoretically, various integrated indicators may be used as dependent variables that represent "learning". However, this paper attempts to estimate the impacts of exporting and other determinants on simple, individual measures. On the one hand, this approach allows for more objectivity, which may be impaired when an aggregation mode for individual measures is subjectively selected. On the other hand, the approach reveals the specific individual measures that are affected by exporting. The individual indicators of learning used as dependent variables and predictors are listed in Tab. 7. 
Tab. 7. Dependent variables and predictors
Model
The results are presented in Tab. 8. As for ex-exporters (i.e., firms that have exited from export markets), they are very similar to non-exporters in their propensity to innovate. However, it should be noted that this group is small in our sample, which may be the reason for the low values of the coefficients.
Meanwhile, many coefficients in this group are negative, which may suggest that exiting firms lose their propensity to innovate, even compared to firms that were never involved in exporting.
Contrary to expectations, the estimations have not revealed any significant effect of ownership type or group membership on the propensity to innovate. The government being an owner does not have any effect at all, while foreign ownership shows only one significant coefficient -on the variable representing domestic benchmarking. The latter, in our view, is quite in line with common sense, as it is reasonable to expect foreign owners to be more interested in global rather than Russian benchmarking of their companies. LRN_05_i -values of respective dependent variables in the previous period. Reference categories: DE_4 (non-exporters), age3, ind1.
Tab. 8. Regression results for the model estimating determinants of firm innovative behavior
Belonging to the Group of companies (holding) does not affect innovative behavior either. This indicator shows the only significant (negative) coefficient -on the formal product design variable. This may be accounted for by the fact that design functions are centralized on the group level and/or that a sizeable portion of products is supplied within the group, which does not provide any incentives for new design solutions.
Notwithstanding that the coefficients on the sector dummy variables are significant for about half of the specifications, we are not in a position to make any explicit or unambiguous conclusions about the strength of learning-by-exporting effects across sectors. In practically every case, sector differences stem from some "natural" specifics of the sector. Thus, it is quite apparent that after-sale maintenance would apply more to machine-building industries than to producers of intermediate goods or current consumption goods (metals, woodworking, chemicals, food and textiles). Overall, outsiders in the learning-by-exporting process will include either small-scale exporters (e.g., food), or mass producers.
To test the third hypothesis, which assumes differences in learning-by-exporting effects depending on whether the export destination is a CIS or non-CIS market, we modify the model by replacing the export status variables (new-old-ex exporters) with variables indicating whether the firm exports to non-CIS markets, only to CIS markets or is not engaged in exporting at all.
Therefore, the equation is specified as 
where NCIS_05 takes a value of 1 if the firm exported to non-CIS countries and 0 otherwise, and CIS_05 takes a value of 1 if the exports were limited to CIS. The other variables in the model are unchanged from the previous specification (Tab. 8). Non-exporters provide a reference group.
Results are reported in Tab. 9.
Tab 9. Impacts of export destination on innovative behavior of firms. Note: *** -significant at the 1 percent level, ** -at 5 percent, * -at 10 percent. In export destination groups, the reference group is the non-exporters, i.e., those who did not report any exporting in either the first or the second round of the survey. LRN_05 denotes a lagged value of the dependent variable. Referecne categories: Non-exporters, age3, ind1.
The estimation results (Tab. 9) suggest that exporters to non-CIS countries are significantly more likely to implement innovations (versus non-exporters), primarily organizational innovations including ISO certification, domestic and international benchmarking, and the establishment of product design units. Regarding technology innovations, significant differences are observed only for the R&D spending indicator.
The learning effect of CIS exports is visibly weaker. Significant positive differences are revealed only on international benchmarking. However, there is a weak correlation with the observed probability of new product introduction. We should also note that exporting limited to CIS markets has a weak and negative effect on the establishment of after-sale service units. This may be explained by the fact that such units are largely needed to service Russian consumers, while in other countries maintenance and servicing may be more efficiently organized through outsourcing (to local companies). This may be further confirmed (indirectly) by the negative (albeit non-significant) coefficient for the group of non-CIS exporters in the service unit equation. Sector-wise, results similar to the first model are preserved.
Another noteworthy finding is that government or foreign ownership practically never shows any impact on learning-by-exporting effects. Firms from the group of old Soviet enterprises look somewhat weaker than firms established after 1991 on variables such as MBA managers and outsourcing, but they tend to implement domestic benchmarking more frequently.
Key conclusions
Contrary to the existing stereotypes of low competitiveness and domestic orientations, Russian manufacturing enterprises were quite active in international markets in the latter half of the last decade. About a half of the sample comprising large and medium-size manufacturing firms was engaged in exporting to some degree. During 2005 During -2009 , average export-to-sales ratios increased significantly. All of the above indicates that Russian firms are increasing their global involvement, albeit slowly. Obviously, export entry goes both ways, with some enterprises exiting export markets. However, the share of export starters in this period is noticeably larger.
In this paper, we have attempted to investigate whether there is any impact of global trade engagement on manufacturing firm behaviors and managerial decisions compared to firms that are only oriented toward the domestic market, and if there is, how exactly it works. Using panel data from the two rounds of the survey, we employed regressions to estimate the probability of innovative decisions by firms depending on their export status, i.e., their belonging to one of the following groups: continuous exporters, export starters who entered export markets during the two rounds of observation, export quitters, and firms never engaged in exporting. The results obtained suggest some tentative conclusions for a positive effect of exporting on embracing new technologies, primarily those in organization and management.
Exporters, most noticeably long-time and continuous exporters, are more active in monitoring their competitors, both domestically and internationally, and more frequently engage highly qualified managers (holders of foreign degrees). Exporters are more active in IT implementation (at least they tend to have formal IT units more frequently). Some evidence has been obtained in support of their increased concern for higher quality of goods, as they establish special-purpose product design units. The most encouraging result may be seen in the evidence on exporters' higher R&D financing, as this is the area where Russian manufacturing enterprises lost more ground than elsewhere during the transformation slump in the 90s. The reestablishment of corporate research practice and culture may be seen as an important shift toward normal development that relies on new, original technological solutions rather than relatively accessible and cheap primary resources.
It should be emphasized that if, as numerous studies and our own earlier results suggest, productivity growth precedes export entry (i.e., firms self-select into export markets), the analysis in this paper would indicate that positive changes in firm innovative behavior seem to occur subsequent to their export entry rather than prior to it. Moreover, this response to changes in the competitive environment does not seem to come instantly. In other words, firms tend to gradually learn new process and management approaches and practices. This conclusion may be supported by the evidence that comparatively recent export starters tend to outperform nonexporters on far fewer parameters than the group of continuous, incumbent exporters. Moreover, "learning" starts from borrowing and embracing managerial decisions and behavior tactics that lead to faster returns, including regular benchmarking, IT implementation, ISO certification, etc.
There is still another conclusion that we can suggest with some caution: non-CIS exporters are more prone to learning. Meanwhile, firms exporting only to CIS markets differ from nonexporters mostly in their closer monitoring of foreign competitors. This finding is quite consistent with other studies, specifically the paper by [Wilhelmsson and Kozlov, 2007] , which shows that productivity gains are more likely for exporters to industrially advanced economies.
It is also of note that we have hardly discovered any dependence of firm behavior on owner characteristics. This evidence is also in line with other studies, showing that firm competitive environment (exposure to strong competition) has a more significant effect on firm behavior patterns than its ownership.
In conclusion, we should say that we do not consider our findings final and exhaustive. Our rough estimates of both behavior and exporting activities (in this study, we largely use qualitative variables, i.e., a decision being made, or exporting taking place) may at best serve as an indication of a positive correlation between exporting and learning. The results will certainly need further elaboration. Another important area of further research may be to extend the range of globalization factors and to supplement the exporting impact analysis with an investigation of possible effects of resource imports as still another channel to shape new behavior patterns.
